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NO SANCTUARY FROM THE LAW:
LEGAL ISSUES FACING CLERGY
Arthur Gross Schaefer and Darren Levine*
I. INTRODUcrION
"I don't want to know" can be five of the most dangerous
words in our litigious society. Ignorance is a poor excuse for liabil-
ity issues, and can be extremely hazardous to the life of clergy and
their institutions. Staggering legal costs, whether an enterprise is
vindicated or not, can significantly devastate both the individual
and the organization's financial and emotional resources. Still,
some religious associations and their clergy continue to think they
are insulated from this legal reality by divine immunity. Perhaps
they believe that they will not be sued because they have altruistic
intentions; or maybe there is a belief that laypeople do not sue
clergy and their churches or synagogues out of an inherent respect
for religious leaders.1 In light of these naive views, there are few
vehicles for clergy to become informed about their legal exposure.
While well publicized cases like Nally v. Grace Community
Church2 and Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California3
* Arthur Gross Schaefer, M.H.L., J.D., C.P.A., Rabbi, Professor of Business
Administration, Loyola Marymount University. Darren Levine, Research Associate
and graduate of the University of California, Santa Cruz, with interests in social eco-
nomics, comparative religion, and law. Special thanks to the remarkable help given
to us by Michael Connally, Esq., of Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard and for the
important comments of John Clewis, director of personnel at Loyola Maryount Uni-
versity, and Cheryl Schreck, Esq., of Musick, Peeler & Garrett.
1. Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Mal-
practice, 9 SAN. FERN. V. L. REv. 47, 66 (1981). The author concludes that "[m]ost
people have an inherent respect for the clergy and share the feeling that to sue a
clergyman partakes of irreverence for him and the religion he serves, which senti-
ment would act as a deterrent to bringing suit." Id.
2. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988) (raising the issue of
whether or not clergy have a duty to prevent suicide).
3. 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding that a psychia-
trist had a duty to warn a third party threatened by a client during a counseling ses-
sion). The duty articulated in this opinion has become a required duty for psychia-
trists, psychotherapists, and social workers. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58
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spawn articles and discussion of a particular legal topic, courses at
seminaries or conventions for clergy on legal liability issues are
few and far between. Unlike college business programs that re-
quire exposure to the legal environment, religious educators per-
ceive no such need. This Article contends that courses in seminar-
ies and at clergy conventions should become the rule rather than
the exception. Clergy need to become more aware of the legal
minefields so that they can better protect themselves and their re-
ligious communities.
When one thinks of our ministers, rabbis, and priests, one of-
ten envisions them from the congregant's viewpoint. Clergy may
incorrectly conclude that their functions are limited to providing
ritualistic services and religious counseling. A closer look reveals
that the minister is often a manager who supervises employees and
volunteers. Moreover, the synagogue or church is a work envi-
ronment where concerns of sexual harassment and discrimination
might be present.4 Lastly, the clergyperson may have a fiduciary
duty to act in certain ways when conducting business on behalf of a
nonprofit organization? Add to this mix all the legal issues that
potentially arise in pastoral counseling and the job description
quickly supersedes that of spiritual leader.6
This Article addresses several legal topics facing the clergy
community: the realities of clergy-congregant privilege, child mo-
lestation and mandatory reporting requirements, employment law,
wrongful termination of an employee, and sexual harassment.
This Article has two goals. First, it seeks to introduce clergy to
some common legal snares in the hope that religious leaders will
ALB. L. REv. 97, 100 (1994) ("Most jurisdictions consider Tarasoff favorably and
only one court has openly rejected its holding to date") (citations omitted); see also
Michael R. Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for
the Violent Acts of Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391, 400 n.55 (1989) (citing expansions
and limitations of the Tarasoff doctrine).
4. Cf Eduardo Cruz, Comment, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy
Sexual Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 505
(1991) (discussing the exploitation of parishioners by clergy).
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See generally James T. O'Reilly and JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Mis-
conduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31 (1994) (discussing a religious institution's potential liability
for the sexual misconduct of clergy members under negligence and respondeat supe-
rior theories); Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to
Free Exercise: Mandating that Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1
(1991) (analyzing whether the Free Exercise Clause protects discussions about child
abuse in a confidential religious setting from state-mandated reporting require-
ments).
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become aware of the serious potential of liability issues that face
them. Second, it is targeted at the legal professional, who should
be encouraged to help individual religious leaders become better
informed in order to guard against the growing number of poten-
tial liability "sinkholes."
II. COUNSELING RELATED ISSUES
A. Confidential Communication
To better understand clergy-congregant privileges one must
start with a review of protected communications generally. To en-
courage frankness and the free flow of information between pro-
fessionals and their clients, certain professions have been accorded
the legal and ethical right to keep communications with their cli-
ents confidential.7 Traditionally, attorney-client communications
have been kept confidential by the canon of ethics adopted by
each state or its bar association. The attorney-client privilege has
now been codified by both state and federal statutes. Although
some privileges may be sought in the codes of ethics of other pro-
fessions such as accountants, physicians, therapists, etc., there has
not been a unified recognition of their right to protect
"communications" with their clients." Each state has adopted
statutes that may or may not allow client communication to be
held free from the eyes of courts and other government agencies."
In many states clergy and congregants are given the right to
hold their penitential communications privileged.12  Against the
backdrop of privileged communication for various professionals,
clergy have often asserted a clergy-congregant privilege.1 3 The Su-
7. Roger L. Miller & Gaylord A. Jentz, BUSINESS LAW TODAY 965 (3d ed.
1994).
8. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1996).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 501; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-952 (West 1995).
10. Miller & Jentz, supra note 7, at 965; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-992,
1010-1012 (West 1995).
11. Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Require-
ments Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV.
723, 740 (1987); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 917, 992, 1010.5, 1012 (West 1995);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1993).
12. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1028, 1032 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1993).
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d. Cir. 1990); Ellis v.
United States, 922 F. Supp. 539 (D. Utah 1996); Niemunn v. Cooley, 637 N.E.2d 943
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
November 19961
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preme Court has stated that "[tihe priest-penitent privilege rec-
ognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total
and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in re-
turn.",4 However, with the exception of communication made to a
Catholic priest in the confessional, most religions do not require
their clergy to keep communication with congregants confiden-
tial."
These privileges are not absolute. In many cases such profes-
sionals may be compelled to disclose confidential information re-
garding their client to state or federal authorities. 6 In addition,
most states require psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers
to report to the authorities when their clients have threatened acts
of physical harm to themselves or to a third person. 7 For example,
the well-known Tarasoff precedent requires all California profes-
sional counselors to report any client who has threatened to inflict
bodily harm on another. Arguably, this duty to disclose informa-
tion should apply to a clergyperson who learns in a confidential
communication that a congregant threatens to harm a third party.
This may mean that the clergyperson has the responsibility to warn
not only to a government authority but also to the potential vic-
tim if the clergy person reasonably believes that the congregant
may commit the crime.
14. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,51 (1980).
15. See Mark Henry, Admission of Crime by Penitent Creates Hard Choice for
Clerics, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1986, Part II at 3. For example, California only affords
this privilege when "under the discipline or tenets of [the clergyperson's] church, de-
nomination, or organization, [the clergyperson] has a duty to keep such communica-
tions secret." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032 (West 1995).
16. For example, there is an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
when the patient is dangerous. Stanley Mosk, Psychotherapist and Patient in the
California Supreme Court: Ground Lost and Ground Regained, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 415
(1993).
17. Arthur Gross Schaefer, Divine Immunity: Should Clergy be Subject to a Stan-
dard of Care?, 40 CPCU J. 217,221 (1987).
18. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551
P.2d 344,340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,20 (1976).
19. See generally Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Report-
ing Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 723 (1987) (discussing the clergy privilege and its conflict with child abuse
reporting requirements).
20. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431,551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
[Vol. 30:177
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B. Legal Theories of Mandatory Reporting
The clergyperson is faced with a legal and ethical dilemma
when made aware of physical abuse. The source of such knowl-
edge might be the victim or perpetrator coming to seek help, or a
concerned third party informant. The clergyperson must take ac-
tion when they have "reasonable" belief that crime is being com-
mitted.2 1 The moment that a hunch becomes a reasonable belief,
the clergyperson should initiate the reporting procedure devised
by their legal counselors.
Many states believe that there is a compelling government in-
terest in protecting children that outweighs free speech and free
exercise of religion.22 For this reason alone, most states require
that professionals report on behalf of the victimized child when
made aware of child molestation;23 some states require all persons
to report an incident of molestation.24 Additionally, all profes-
sional counselors are required to report any possible child abuse
that their client confesses-or risk the revocation of their license.
2 5
New Hampshire has the strictest law. It requires "any per-
son," including clergy, "having reason to suspect that a child has
been abused or neglected" to report his or her findings.26 Con-
versely, Washington does not include clergy amongst the parties
that must report.2
21. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report Child Abuse, 73
A.L.R.4TH 782, 806 (1989).
22. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). The area of
mandatory reporting may well become a battleground between church and state, es-
pecially for those religious traditions whose canons do not allow for the disclosure of
privileged information.
23. See id.; Mitchell, supra note 19, at 727 & n.20 (discussing most states' re-
quirement that physicians and various professionals report abuse).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1995).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). California law re-
quires that:
any child care custodian, health practitioner, [or non-medical practitioner].
. who has knowledge of or observes a child in his or her professional ca-
pacity or within the scope of his or her employment•... or reasonably sus-
pects has been the victim of child abuse shall report the known or suspected
instance of child abuse to a child protective agency immediately or as soon
as practically possible by telephone and shall prepare and send a written
report thereof within 36 hours of receiving the information ....
Id.
26. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1995); see ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-518
(1992); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1993).
27. State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
November 1996]
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In Utah clergy must report child abuse when they learn of the
abuse from any source other than the offender's confession.28 The
act of confessing shows that the offender has taken the responsibil-
ity to seek help and is looking to correct the behavior. However,
when the clergyperson learns of child abuse through privileged in-
formation from a third party, it is obvious that the offender is not
looking to change the behavior, and the clergyperson is required to
report this information to the proper authorities.
The reporting requirement poses an interesting question for
clergy. By the nature of their profession, clergy may wish to deal
with the sensitive matter within the church through prayer and in a
confidential manner. If they choose not to report the incident,
clergy may unknowingly be violating specific statutory regulations
or general tort duties.
Many believe that clergy should report all child abuse matters
to the appropriate state agency whether or not church staff are29
mandatory reporters. On the other hand, some groups argue that
requiring clergy to report child abuse would ruin the confidential-
ity of the congregant-clergy relationship and make clergy reluctant
to engage in counseling.30 The concern is that without confidential-
ity the abuse would continue because the confider would have no-
body to turn to and would not know how to self-correct the behav-
ior.3' A majority of states have resolved the conflict in favor of
specifically requiring clergy, including Catholic priests, to report
even the suspicion of child abuse or neglect regardless of the rami-
fications.32
It is now well established that child abuse must be reported to
a state agency.33 But what about reporting spousal or elder abuse?
These are serious crimes as well. Each clergyperson must answer
this moral question and decide in the face of potentially serious le-
gal ramifications. This Article contends that regardless of pro-
28. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(3) (1993).
29. See Gross Schaefer, supra note 17, at 221.
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id.
32. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 730; Jeffrey Warren Scott, Confidentiality and
Child Abuse: Church and State Collide, 103 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 174, 174
(1986); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11174 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-201 (1995).
33. Douglas J. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected
Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REv. 458, 465 & n.36 (1978); see also O'Brien &
Flannery, supra note 6, at 18 n.106 (explaining in detail the reporting requirements
of all states).
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tected communication, the clergyperson has a moral obligation to
report such specific acts of violence to the proper authorities in or-
der to protect the victims. Only after this has been done can the
clergyperson enter into counseling with the involved individuals.
C. Advice When an Incident of Child Molestation Occurs
Dealing with an incident or allegation of child molestation is
an unfortunate but very real situation. It is natural to want to ad-
dress the situation quickly and quietly because reputations are at
stake; however, such haste often creates further problems. Most
importantly, the clergyperson should treat every complaint as seri-
ous until proven otherwise. 34
When made aware of a potential child molestation case, a
clergyperson should immediately contact an attorney who is
knowledgeable about the reporting requirements. Next, the cler-
gyperson should contact the appropriate state agency that receives
reports of child abuse. s Clergy should cover these grounds first
before raising the issue with the alleged perpetrator. The cler-
gyperson must maintain the confidentiality of the parties by limit-
ing the number of people who are informed of the situation.
1. The perpetrator confesses
When a perpetrator confesses to child molestation, the cler-
gyperson should contact an attorney for advice on the most appro-
priate way to conduct an investigation, preserve confidentiality so
as to avoid defamation suits, and handle the possible employment
termination so as to have a strong case in the event of a lawsuit.
The clergyperson should immediately remove the perpetrator
from any position involving contact with minors. The alleged vic-
tims and their parents should be interviewed to determine the
possibility of other victims. With utmost care and with the advice
of counsel, the clergyperson should consider making public the
fact that a child has been molested at the site. This should be done
without revealing the identity of the perpetrator in order to en-
34. The government considers a person "aware" when they have a reasonable
belief of past, present, or future child abuse. See Besharov, supra note 33, at 471; see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1992) (creating a duty to report if one "knows
or reasonably suspects" abuse).
35. Mandatory reporters face possible criminal liability for failure to report. See
Stecks v. Young, 38 Cal. App. 4th 365, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (1995); People v. Hodges,
10 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 20,13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (1992).
36. See Hodges, 10 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 30,13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418.
November 1996]
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courage other victims to come forward.
2. The alleged perpetrator does not confess
The most common situation is when an alleged perpetrator of
child abuse does not confess. It is a mistake to assume innocence
based solely on the alleged perpetrator's denial of any wrongdoing.
First, the clergyperson should contact an attorney to determine the
appropriate course of action. It may be appropriate to meet with
the alleged victim's parents to assure them that the institution does
not tolerate sexual molestation and is actively pursuing the allega-
tion. Also, the clergyperson may wish to share the investigation
procedure with the family. The clergyperson may discuss with the
family what they would like the religious institution to do if the ac-
cused is found guilty. Lastly, the clergyperson may want to find
out if the alleged victim or the victim's family has mentioned the
allegations to anyone else in order to better appreciate the number
of individuals aware of the situation.
After these consultations the clergyperson will need to inves-
tigate the matter immediately; issue a warning to the alleged per-
petrator; interview the accused and the accused person's supervi-
sor, potential witnesses, or other alleged victims; and consider
running a criminal records check on the accused. The clergyper-
son must conduct the investigation judiciously to avoid having a
child abuse allegation lead to a future "wrongful termination" suit.
The clergyperson should keep the family of the victim informed of
progress at all times. Lastly, the clergyperson must be certain to
document everything from the initial accusation to the last piece of
the investigation.
In most cases the accused will not confess. Guilt or innocence
will depend upon witness testimony and physical evidence such as
notes and letters. While the investigation is underway, the alleged
perpetrator should be treated with care because people are inno-
cent until proven guilty. Handling the case negligently or treating
the employee outrageously may violate the individual's rights and
create grounds for future wrongful termination litigation. How-
ever, it would be wise and appropriate to immediately remove the
accused from any isolated contact with minors."8
37. Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 (1994).
38. It is critical to understand that there are many delicate issues that could arise
beyond the legal considerations, including feelings of pain, hurt, and hostility. For
[Vol. 30:177
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III. EMPLOYEE SUPERVISION
A. Related Employment Laws
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196439 applies to institu-
tions with fifteen or more employees ° and outlaws discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.4' Employers are prohibited from making employment de-
cisions based on these distinctions. The Act provides for compen-
satory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimina-
tion.42 Similarly, most states have constitutional provisions or code
sections that prohibit discrimination in hiring or employment. 43
For instance, the California Constitution provides that "[a] person
may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, pro-
fession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color,
or national or ethnic origin."" In addition to this constitutional
provision, California has made it unlawful for religion to be a fac-
tor in emplo yment decisions such as promotion, demotion, and
termination.
Nonprofit religious organizations are granted a limited ex-
emption from the provisions of Title VII in that they may legally
discriminate on the basis of religion.46 They may legally consider
religious practice and belief when making employment decisions
regarding employees performing ritual and spiritual functions such
as priests, pastors, and rabbis. 47 The courts have consistently con-
example, the congregation may become polarized with some members contending
that the person is guilty while others support the person's innocence. A pastor could
easily get caught in the middle of a split community with the congregants turning on
the pastor.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2001 (1994).
40. Id § 2000(e).
41. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
42. Id. § 1981(b).
43. HENRY H. PERRIT-r, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACrICE 126 (3d
ed. 1992).
44. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
47. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (citing Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 799 (D. Utah
1984)); see King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The Free
Exercise Clause precludes governmental interference with ecclesiastical hierarchies,
church administration, and appointment of clergy"); see also Scott D. McClure, Note,
Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions: How Far May Religious Organiza-
tions Go?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 587, 591 (1990) (discussing the Free Exercise right of re-
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cluded that where clergy employment is involved, religious groups
are free from government scrutiny.48 Additionally, religious
schools may discriminate in the hiring of teachers based on relig-
ious preference. 49 Here, the law protects the religious institution
from the religion element of employment discrimination.0
Except under certain circumstances,' protection from Title
VII exemption does not exist in the hiring of non-clergy to per-
form secular work at religious institutions. Religious groups re-
main subject to legal scrutiny if the issue involves employee dis-
crimination based on race, gender, national origin, or other
protected classifications against employees other than clergy.53
However, because no legal definition of 'clergy' exists, some
groups avoid employment laws by claiming that every staff mem-
ber is clergy.4
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)55 pro-
hibits both profit and nonprofit employers from discriminating
against persons based on their age.56 However, this only applies to
employees other than clergy who are at least forty years of age.57
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)5" prohibits discrimi-
nation against qualified persons with mental or physical disabili-
ligious institutions to select employees most capable of carrying out their missions).
48. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391,395-99 (1987).
49. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that reservation of seven out of thirty one teaching positions for Jesuits by a Jesuit
Catholic university was not discrimination).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
51. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336, 339; see also McClure, supra note 48, at 594-600
(analyzing the potential scope of the religious organization exemption).
52. hd at 397.
53. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,558 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-85 (1981); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608
A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
56. The ADEA prohibits companies with 20 or more employees from refusing to
hire, compensate, discharge, or in some other manner discriminate against individu-
als because of their age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 630(b). The ADEA is enforced by the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(4). ADEA also provides for jury trials and compensatory damages. 29
U.S.C. § 626.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); see also Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 699 F. Supp. 954 (D.D.C. 1988), affid, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that the application of the ADEA to clergy would violate the
Free Exercise Clause).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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ties, including AIDS and other "grave" diseases, and the nonprofit
religious institution must uphold these employee protections.
B. Wages and Compensation
Federal law requires profit and nonprofit employers to pay
their employees a minimum hourly wage as well as time-and-a-half
for hours worked in excess of forty in one week.?° Certain employ-
ees, such as religious professionals who are highly compensated,
may be exempt.' The determination of excludable categories is
quite complex and may allow for the exemption of an employee
who is an executive, administrator, or professional if that person
both manages the business and is involved in the hiring and firing
of employees.62
In some situations employers may be liable for pay even when
a regularly paid employee works voluntarily.0 Employees must
receive credit for short rest periods when they cannot use the time
effectively for their own purposes 4 Lastly, the employer must pay
a penalty for any amount wrongfully withheld from the em-
ployee.6 5 Additionally, each state has its own regulations and re-
quirements that govern this area.6
59. Id. § 12112(a)(b). But see Doe v. Attorney General, 814 F. Supp. 844, 849
(1992) (citing Carter v. Casa Cent. 849 F.2d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
an employer may inquire into an individual's disability if it is relevant to the job and
can consider risks posed by a contagious disease in determining the individual's
qualifications)).
60. 29 U.S.C. H§ 201, 207(a)(1) (1994); see A. JAMES BARNES ET AL., LAW FOR
BusINESs 377 (1994).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1996).
62. BARNES ET AL., supra note 60, at 337.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 (1995). Also, it has been suggested that an employee can-
not be treated as an unpaid volunteer when performing regular work for the em-
ployer in the same work week in which he is also an employee. See, e.g., Rodriguez
v. Township of Holiday Lakes, 866 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that a
volunteer patrol officer is not a volunteer to be exempt from the minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA); cf 29 C.F.R. § 553.102 (1995) (dealing with public agen-
cies).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 785.15 (1995).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1995); see Susan Palmer Adams, The Standard of Willful-
ness for Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 32
EMORY L.J. 583, 585 n.9 (1983).
66. For example, California law calls for overtime compensation after eight
hours per day or forty hours per week. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(3)(A).
November 1996]
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1. Equal Pay Act
Employers must compensate their employees equally without
regard to gender for jobs that require identical skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility when those jobs are performed in the same establish-
ment and under similar working conditions.68 Different rates of
pay are permitted under seniority and merit systems but must not
be gender-based. 9
2. Workers' compensation
Established in the early 1920s, workers' compensation laws
place liability for injuries occurring within the scope of employ-
ment on the employer without regard to fault.70 This means that
regardless of negligence, the employer is liable for an employee's
injury. Employers typically contribute to either a state fund or
they self-insure, but all claims are administered by a combination
71of federal guidelines and state supervision.
Volunteers who receive "no remuneration for services other
than meals, transportation, lodging, or reimbursement for inciden-
tal expenses" are excluded from workers' compensation laws7'2 but
may sue the organization if a work-related injury arises out of their
work.73 For instance, a volunteer teacher whose spouse arrives
uninvited and shoots the teacher while at school cannot recover
damages because the injury was not related to the work of teach-
ing. However, if a student shoots the volunteer teacher, the
teacher's employer would be liable for compensation because this
may be considered an injury arising out of employment.
67. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994). The Equal Pay Act is an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Id. § 201 (1994).
68. Employers are only subject to the Equal Pay Act if covered by the Fair La-
bor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1995).
69. BARNES ET AL., supra note 60, at 383.
70. These laws grew out of the situation in the 1800s when it was nearly impos-
sible for an employee who was injured on the job to recover damages from the em-
ployer. Id. at 374. The difficulty was in proving the employer negligent rather than
another worker. Id.
71. See Robert A. Kagan, Book Review, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 816 (1984)
(reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983)).
72. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(i) (West Supp. 1996).
73. See Martinez v. Workers' Compensation App. Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 982, 544 P.2d
1350, 127 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976) (awarding workers' compensation to a volunteer for
injuries suffered while acting in good faith to prevent a theft).
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C. Avoiding Wrongful Termination Suits74
Terminating a worker's employment is never a pleasant expe-
rience, and unfortunately, clergy often find themselves as part of
the dismissal procedure. Moreover, terminating employees can
create a "legal minefield." Religious professionals, lay leadership,
and religious institutions are not immune from wrongful discharge
or negligent hiring claims and the associated financial and emo-
tional burdens.75 Religious institutions and their leadership should
carefully create an employment process that reduces exposure to
wrongful termination lawsuits.
1. Publicizing the job opening
Job openings should be well publicized so that individuals in-
terested in the position have a fair opportunity to apply.76 Accord-
ingly, positions should be reasonably advertised and allow a rea-
sonable amount of time for applicants to submit applications.,
Due to the many limitations on what types of questions can and
cannot be asked, it is critical that the employment application be
reviewed by an attorney who specializes in the employment field.
It is also helpful to have an attorney or human resources profes-
sional review public job announcements before they are placed to
ensure that the advertisement is accurate, complete, and not in
violation of any current statutory requirements.8
When pre-employment substance abuse tests or other physical
or mental qualifications are required, the applicant must be noti-
fied in the job announcement.79
74. Adapted from Stuart W. Rudnick, Examining Legal Issues Facing Individuals
with Pastoral Responsibilities, Avoiding Wrongful Termination Claims, (Nov. 18,
1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
75. E.g., Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 8 Cal. App. 4th 828,834-
36, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 752-53 (1992) (holding that a church may be held liable un-
der a negligent hiring theory for acts of employee).
76. KENNETH L. SOVEREIGN, PERSONNEL LAw 40 (3d ed. 1994).
77. Id.
78. Not all attorneys have adequate knowledge. Religious institutions are noto-
riously short on cash and like to use congregants for free legal advice whenever pos-
sible. However, due to the extraordinary number of complex issues involved in per-
sonnel matters, it is important to use an attorney who is competent in employment
issues.
79. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1989) (holding that an employer does not violate job applicants' rights to privacy





To avoid asking a job candidate illegal questions such as mari-
tal status, dependents, maiden name, spouse's occupation, and
pregnancy-related issues,80 selection committees should meet with
a human resources professional or attorney prior to interviewing
applicants to learn which inquiries are permissible. There are a
wide variety of laws that impose limitations upon the type of in-
quiries that can be made and the methods that can be used to ac-
quire such information. For instance, California law prohibits
companies from using arrests not resulting in convictions as crite-
ria for employment.8 There is an exception for applicants or vol-
unteers who may have advising or disciplinary power over minors
or persons under their direction." In this case employers may re-
quest any information from the California Department of Justice
and use such information in their hiring decisions.
Employers should use the interview as a time to evaluate the
candidate's social interaction skills and interest in the position.
Employers should not use the interview to obtain basic data. In-
stead, employers should prepare for interviews using information
from the applicant's recent employment history, education, skills,
abilities, and interest in the position based on the candidate's ap-
plication, recommendations, and resum6. Since the nature of the
interview is interactive, the selection committee must take care not
to make oral representations that the institution may disagree with
or be unable to fulfill since promises made during an interview
may become legally binding obligations.8
3. Prescreening candidates
Exercising care at the prescreening stage is critical since em-
ployers are usually found liable for the torts of their employees
under the doctrine of respondeat superior-"let the master an-
swer."'85 This theory can place responsibility for employee actions
within the hands of the employer---in some cases a church or
80. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1996) (offering a detailed explanation of sex
discrimination).
81. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1996).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.3 (West 1992).
83. Id.
84. Rudnick, supra note 74, at 9.
85. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 69,
at 499-500 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
86. MICHAEL B. METZGER ET AL., BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY
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synagogue. If an employee commits a crime, injures a person, or
damages property while acting within the scope of employment,
7
the victim may be able to sue the religious institution for dam-
ages." Victims may also sue religious organizations for negligence
in the hiring or supervision of the employee. 9
As in the area of interviews, there are certain actions that are
legally permitted to protect the institution and others that are not.
For instance, employers may not recuire that a potential employee
take a lie detector or similar test. Pre-employment substance
abuse testing is permissible, provided the applicant is advised of
the testing requirements when the application is first made, the
testing procedures are not impermissibly intrusive, access to the
results are restricted, and testing is done for applicants for the
same job or class of jobs.9' Pre-employment physical examinations
are permissible, provided all employees entering similar positions
are subject to the same exam and the results are used only as
permitted by the ADA.92 Employers may not use the results of an
HIV antibody test as a basis to evaluate an individual's compe-
tence for employment because AIDS is considered a disability and
religious institutions are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of
ENVIRONMENT 743 (9th ed. 1995).
87. The issue of whether an employee's conduct is within the scope of employ-
ment is subject to a careful review of the particular facts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228(1) cmt. a, d (1958). The Restatement (Second) of Agency uses a
test that the actions must have been "not unexpectable" by the employer to be
within the scope of employment. Id. § 228(1). Additional factors include: (1)
whether this was the kind of act that the employee was employed to perform, (2)
whether the action occurred substantially within the authorized time period, (3)
whether the action occurred substantially within the location authorized by the em-
ployer, (4) whether the employee's motivation was, at least in part, to serve the em-
ployer. Id.
88. However, some courts have held that a church may not be held liable for
child molestation by clergy or volunteers, such as school teachers, on the grounds
that such conduct is, as a matter of law, outside the scope of their employment. See,
e.g., Jeffrey E. v. Central Bishop Church, 197 Cal. App. 3d 718, 722, 243 Cal. Rptr.
128, 130 (1988); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453,
1461,232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (1986).
89. See Evan F., 8 Cal. App. 4th at 843-44, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59 (holding
that a church can be sued for negligent hiring practices); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFTORTS § 411(b) (1965) (dealing with the negligent hiring of contractors).
90. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1989). For federal statutes, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 2002 (1994).
91. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1051,264 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06.
92. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1995); see CAL. Civ.
CODE § 56 (West 1982).
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disability.93 Lastly, all employers must establish candidates' true
identities and be certain they are legally permitted to work in the
United States, for it is unlawful to hire undocumented immi-
grants.94
4. Hiring the candidate
What is said and done during the time when the employment
relationship is established will greatly affect the circumstances un-
der which the employer will be able to terminate the employee.95
Therefore, it is critical to clearly develop the grounds and proce-
dures for employee evaluation and dismissal at the beginning of
the employment relationship. Such procedures must be carefully
followed to avoid inconsistent applications or violations of com-
pany procedures that can later be used by the plaintiff in a wrong-
ful termination lawsuit.9 It is therefore a good idea to have all
employment contracts written and reviewed by an attorney famil-
iar with employment issues.97 The contract should describe alter-
native grounds for dismissal. Otherwise, termination may occur
only in the case of neglect of duty, a willful breach of duty during
the course of employment, or continued incompetence of the em-
ployee.98 Open-ended employment agreements without a specified
term may be terminated at the will of the employee or the em-
ployer.99 However, difficulties in terminating "at will" employees
arise if promises are made at the hiring stage concerning job secu-
rity and probationary periods.'
5. Preventive measures during the relationship
Steps can be taken during the employment relationship to
maintain a healthy and well-defined working environment. Per-
sonnel manuals, employee evaluations, progressive discipline, and
a careful monitoring of supervisors can be invaluable for protect-
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) prohibits discrimination against disabled persons who
could otherwise do the job. The Ninth Circuit has held that HIV infection is a dis-
ability. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1995).
95. Susan L. Paulus, Measures to Reduce Litigation Risks and Control Litigation
Costs, in UNJUST DISMISSAL UPDATE 1985, at 725, 727 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1985).
96. Id. at 726.
97. See supra, note 78.
98. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2924 (West 1989).
99. Id. § 2922.
100. See Paulus, supra note 95; at 727.
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ing the employer from wrongful termination lawsuits. Personnel
manuals and employee handbooks can be a very effective medium
to communicate employment procedures, policies, rules, expecta-
tions, probationary periods, job security, grounds for discipline,
and grievance procedures. However, these handbooks can be con-
tractually binding and therefore must be scrupulously crafted and
carefully followed.'0 '
Employee evaluations serve two very important purposes with
regard to job performance. If done properly, they can monitor the
effectiveness of the employee and serve as notices for praise or
constructive criticism. Further, in the case of a trial, they can act
as evidence that an employer's decision to terminate was based
solely upon performance-related issues.' 2
Progressive discipline is different from standard employee
evaluations as it focuses on correcting personnel problems rather
then punishing employees for misconduct. Accordingly, the ap-
proach is developmental with a process of oral warnings, followed
by written warnings, suspension, and finally, release if perform-
ance does not improve. This procedure can also serve as protec-
tion against wrongful termination claims.0 3 An employee that has
been warned of the need to improve may find it very difficult to
prove that he or she has been treated unfairly. An effective
warning should have the following parts: (1) a written description
of the employee's trans ession," (2) a statement of what is ex-
pected of the employees (3) a statement of how much time the
employee has to rectify the situation,. 6 and (4) a statement of what
will occur if the expectations are not met.0 7 The employer should
maintain dated copies of all written warnings.
Wrongful discharge claims are often the result of poor rela-
tions between supervisors and employees.0' Harassment, dis-
101. Id. at 748-51. Lawsuits are often based in part on employers' failure to fol-
low their own procedures as set forth in their manual or in their policies. Id. at 769.
See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 625-27 (Minn. 1983).
102. Paulus, supra note 95, at 753; see Lawrence v. Northrop, 980 F.2d 66, 71 (1st
Cir. 1992).
103. Paulus, supra note 95, at 758.
104. IL at 760.
105. Id. at 761.
106. Susan G. Tannenbaum, Employee Relations Guide, in ADVANCED
STRATEGIES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 506-07 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 342, 1986).
107. IL at 506.
108. See Jerome B. Kauff & David E. Block, Recent Developments in the Law of
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crimination, wage violations, and occupational safety violations on
behalf of supervisors may put the employers in jeopardy of being
sued for wrongful termination."9 Communication between the
employer and supervisors should be carefully maintained and fos-
tered. Additional preventive measures include: developing and
using a probationary period; developing a severance policy to help
with out-placement assistance; developing a grievance procedure;
using "at-will" language in employment forms, documents, hand-
outs, policies, manuals and agreements; and using annual individ-
ual employment contracts. 11°
6. Terminating the employee
Nobody enjoys the discomfort of ending relationships on
negative terms. Nonetheless, clergy are often involved in the ter-
mination process. When this situation arises there are measures
that can be taken to reduce the potential for wrongful termination
claims. One must be certain that the decision to terminate con-
forms with applicable law, is consistent with the organization's
policies, and is fundamentally fair. The following are some of the
questions to be considered.
a. is the employee in a protected classification or status?
It is illegal to discharge employees on the basis of their race or
ethnicity," age,' disability," or pregnancy. Employees who are
on a leave of absence due to pregnancy, family reasons, work-
related reasons, military service, or jury duty are afforded special
protection." 5 Further, a decision to terminate an employee who
Unjust Dismissal, in ADVANCED STRATEGIES IN: LITIGATING, SETrLING, AND
AVOIDING UNJUST DISMISSAL AND AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 1987, at 121-23
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1987).
109. Kathleen A. Smith, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency
Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 247 (1987); see Kauff & Block, supra note
108, at 93; Donald G. Kempf, Jr. & Roger L. Taylor, Wrongful Discharge: Historical
Evolution, Current Developments and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 28 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 117, 123 (1991).
110. Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 135, 149 (1990).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1995).
112. Id. § 6102.
113. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1995) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability).
114. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1995).
115. Wendy Strimling, The Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Employment
Leave for Pregnancy: Rethinking Geduldig After Cal Fed, 77 CAL. L. REV. 171, 175
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has recently complained of discrimination, sexual harassment, or
unsafe working conditions may be risky because the termination
may be seen as retaliation for the previous complaints.
11 6
b. has the employee been with the institution for several years?
The longer the term of employment, the more difficult it is to
prove rightful termination. 1 7 The standard question is as follows:
"If the employee was so terrible, why did the employer wait so
long to terminate employment?"
c. has the employer conducted an investigation into the terms of the
employee's discharge?
The supervisor must substantiate the discharge through wit-
nesses or written documentation such as employee evaluations and
progressive discipline records. The employer should properly no-
tify the employee of poor performance and allow opportunity to
improve. Prior to any final decision, the employer should give the
employee an adequate opportunity to tell his or her side of the
story.
d. can the employer effectively articulate the reason if a dispute or
litigation arises?
How strong is the evidence of the event that triggered the dis-
charge? How strong is the documentation of progressive disci-
pline? What do the employee's performance evaluations reflect?
Has the employer looked at the employee's personnel records?
Are there compelling explanations or sympathies that favor retain-
ing the employee? How have similar situations been handled in
the past? Has the employee's version of the "triggering event"
been documented? Should there be a final warning instead of
(1989).
116. Title VII provides a cause of action to redress discharges in retaliation for
complaints about discrimination or harassment. Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747
F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of
liability for retaliation against complaints of sexual harassment, discrimination, and
unsafe working conditions, see Jana Howard Carey, Sexual Harassment: Avoiding
Lawsuits and Litigation Strategies, in AVOIDING AND LITIGATING SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT CLAIMS 1996 7, 11, 61-67 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series 1996).
117. Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1783, 1812 (1996); see Paulus, supra note 95, at 756;
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accomodating Just Cause and Employment At
Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8,44-47 (1993).
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termination? And, have the decision-makers been fully informed?
These questions need to be asked.
e. has the termination procedure followed the institution's normal
discharge practices as described in the employer's handbook?
Information found in an employee handbook can be legally
binding."' Be certain to remain consistent with such printed in-
formation.
f. have other similarly situated employees been treated the same?
It is important to be consistent with termination procedures to
limit the potential for wrongful termination. While it is not easy to
terminate an employee, it may be legally dangerous to continue
using the services of an employee for which there are valid
grounds for dismissal." 9 Should the employee act in such a manner
to cause injury to a third party or other employees, the religious
institution and the supervisor could be liable for negligent super-
vision.20 Thus, the choice between keeping or firing an employee
is not always an easy decision, especially when both options may
be fraught with problematic legal and ethical consequences.'
Finally, employers must conduct a fair and thorough exit in-
terview for all employees. It is important to learn employees' per-
ceptions of why they are being terminated. It is a good rule of
thumb to have a third party present at the exit interview to serve
as a witness and to document the date, time, place, and what is said
by whom. Be certain to document the proceedings and identify
and deal with any claims of unfairness.
118. Kurt S. Decker, Reinstatement: A Remedy for an Employer's Violation of a
Handbook or Written Employement Policy, 3 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 4 (1985).
119. See Paulus, supra note 95, at 777; Jay Rand, Employment Protection for the
Substance Abuser, 9 CoMP. LAB. LJ. 450,452 (1988).
120. See, e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 387 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that there is a cause of action against a church for negligent supervision of a
pastor who allegedly abused a confidential relationship with a parishioner and ma-
nipulated the parishioner into a sexual relationship).
121. Beyond the legal considerations, there are many ethical issues relating to
employment decisions. While there are many good sources, the use of an ethics de-
cision model may help to clarify the ethical considerations and provide alternative
responses to an employer's decision. Arthur Gross Schaefer, Ethics Model (Nov. 25,
1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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D. Proper Use of Volunteer Labor
Utilizing the help of volunteer workers can be very rewarding
for both the religious institution and the volunteer. Religious or-
ganizations need the help of volunteer workers, and cultivating the
satisfaction one receives from helping at a synagogue or church
can be priceless. However, there are legalities that supervisors and
employers must be aware of before enlisting the use of volunteer
labor.
Volunteers are not protected under workers' compensation
insurance while performing services for nonprofit organizations
because they are not considered employees,' although some car-
riers will provide coverage for volunteers at a premium.'13 There-
fore, one should only use volunteer workers in activities that pro-
vide a low risk of injury. Insurance carriers may define the limit-
ations placed on volunteer activities. Since accidents do happen, it
is best to develop guidelines that will limit the potential for acci-
dents and in turn limit the number of liability claims or lawsuits
against the organization. Additionally, contractors who donate
services should carry their own insurance 2 4 as most insurance car-
riers do not cover donated services. It is wise to treat this situation
like any other business dealing in the sense that a contract should
be drawn and approved by both parties.
In addition to concerns regarding physical harm to volunteers,
there is also a need to properly train, supervise, and screen volun-
teers, especially if their work involves children.1 2 A religious insti-
tution may be liable if one of its volunteers molests a child or har-
asses a worker. It is a sure breach of the institution's legal and
122. See generally, Charles R. Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable
Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 434 (1991) (discussing whether a volunteer's re-
covery should be equivalent to what the volunteer would have received if eligible to
receive workers' compensation or whether the volunteer should be entitled to dam-
ages under tort theories).
123. See, e.g., Martinez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 982,
985, 544 P.2d 1350, 1351, 127 Cal. Rptr. 150, 151 (1976) (involving a Roman Catholic
Bishop who obtained a workers' compensation insurance policy that covered volun-
teer workers).
124. It would be wise to make sure that contractors show evidence of carrying
workers' compensation insurance and having proper licenses. It would also be im-
portant to make sure that "hard hat" areas are enforced and that access to construc-
tion sites is limited.
125. See, e.g., Nancy A. Lauten, Who's Minding the Cradle? Regulatory Reform in
the Child Care Industry, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. RaV. 633, 643-44 (1985) (discussing Flor-
ida's recently passed child abuse prevention legislation).
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ethical duties to give a volunteer who has a record of sexual of-
fenses access to children or to allow the volunteers to move freely
within the institution. Unfortunately, religious organizations must
realize that actions done by volunteers, just as the actions of paid
workers, may result in legal liability for the institution.
E. Sexual Harassment
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature can violate Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act." 6 Victims can be awarded front
pay, the value of lost fringe benefits, emotional distress relief, and
the reinstatement of seniority. z7 Additionally, federal law pro-
vides up to $300,000 in damages to victims plus punitive damages
against the employer.'8 While sexual discrimination in the relig-
ious organization may be legal in certain circumstances related to. .. 129
employment responsibilities, sexual harassment is not-and re-
ligious institutions will be liable for the actions of its clergy, staff,
and lay leadership if they engage in sexual harassment. 0 The
problem facing all organizations and employees is a changing so-
cial climate in which previously acceptable actions may now be le-
gally actionable. For instance, continually asking a coworker for a
date could be considered sexual harassment.1
3 '
1. Sexual harassment policies in the workplace
With the growing social and media attention given to sexual
harassment, there has been a resulting increase in the number of
lawsuits alleging such harassment.12 In many states there exist re-
126. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1972 prohibits sex
discrimination by all employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(b),
2000e-2(a) (1994). In 1986 the United States Supreme Court ruled that sexual har-
assment based on a "hostile work environment" constitutes sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). Most
states have their own statutes that also provide relief for claims of sexual harassment,
such as the California Fair Employment and Housing Act which specifically makes
sexual harassment an unlawful employment practice. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12940(h) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1).
128. Id. § 1981(b)(3); see Tammy W. Moore, War on Sexual Harassment Enters
New Phase, Bus. REC., Nov. 22, 1993, at 5.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
130. O'Reilly & Strosser, supra note 6, at 58.
131. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
132. See Carol Kleinman, New Tactics Against Sexual Harassment, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 14, 1992, at C2.
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quirements that all institutions have sexual harassment policies in
which "sexual harassment" is defined and that reporting and in-
vestigation procedures of complaints are clearly established.'3
3 A
general legal definition of harassment should include quid pro quo
harassment-that is, employment decisions affecting any individ-
ual that results from submission to or rejection of unwelcome sex-
ual behavior, as well as harassment that creates a hostile environ-
ment for members of one gender.'3
The antisexual harassment policy should contain specific ex-
amples of verbal, physical, and visual harassment. Verbal harass-
ment includes jokes or teasing of a sexual nature and continuing to
express personal interest after being informed that such interest is
unwelcome. Visual harassment includes leering, whistling, or
sexually suggestive objects. Physical harassment includes un-
wanted touching, brushing against the body, or impeding or
blocking another's movement.
The complaint procedure should be written in understandable
language, not legalese. The policy should encourage employees to
report all incidents of sexual harassment and should spell out the
procedure for doing so. To make it "friendlier" and "safer" for a
complaint to be filed, the procedure should allow for reporting to
be made to a variety of individuals, not just to one office or person.
To demonstrate that every complaint will be taken seriously, the
procedure should clearly delineate the steps that the institution
will take when a complaint is lodged, including a fair and prompt
investigation which respects confidentiality to the maximum extent
possible.
Guidelines for appropriate disciplinary measures and monitor-
ing of subsequent behavior of offenders will convey the serious-
ness with which such offenses will be regarded. The religious or-
ganization's written policy should also provide an important
opportunity to spell out the conviction that sexual harassment will
not be tolerated at any level of the organization, from the clergy
and staff to lay leaders and members.
133. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992).
134. Benjamin E. Goldman et al., Recent Developments in Labor and Employment
Law: Sexual Harassment Update for California Employers (Graham & James, LLP,
San Francisco, Cal.), Oct. 1993, at Part IV.A.
135. Id. at Part III.
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2. Liability in sexual harassment claims
Employers will be liable for a hostile work environment cre-
ated by another employee if the employer "should have known"
about the improper conduct.'36 Employers can learn of sexual har-
assment via first-hand knowledge, through observation, or through
formal complaints. Even without first-hand knowledge, the em-
ployer may be held to have "constructive" knowledge.'37 Under
constructive knowledge, it is assumed that harassment is recog-
nized by the employer if harassment is well known amongst em-
ployees.138 Thus the employer may be held liable even in the ab-
sence of first-hand knowledge.
In some states an employer may have "imputed" liability in a
hostile environment case.n9 This rare situation is characterized by
a supervisor's harassment that falls within the "scope of employ-
ment" or "apparent authority.' 141 If an employer knew of sexual
misconduct and did nothing to prevent it, the courts would con-
sider the employer as authorizing the supervisor to continue such
behavior. 141 This would technically bring the supervisor's actions
within the scope of employment.
The employer may also be held liable by failing to establish an
effective policy against sexual harassment, including a formal
complaint procedure. 42 Without such a policy the employees
might believe that harassment might be tolerated or even con-
doned by the management.' 43 Again, the supervisor's actions may
be within the supervisor's "apparent authority"' and will be im-
puted to the employer.'4 5
136. Id. at Part IV.B.2; METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 1092.
137. See Goldman et al., supra note 134, at Part IV.B.2.
138. Id.
139. See id at Part IV.B.3; Murren Roy, Employer Liability for Sexual Harass-
ment, 48 SMU L. REv. 289 (1994); Ronald Turner, Employer Liability under Title
VII for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Im-
pact and Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank, 33 How. L.J. 1, 18 (1990).




144. Apparent authority arises when a third party forms a reasonable belief that
the action taken was authorized conduct. See METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 741.
145. See id. at 741-42; see, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir.
1985).
[Vol. 30:177
NO SANCTUARY FROM THE LAW
3. Preventing sexual harassment and reducing liability
The creation of a sexual harassment policy, whether mandated
or not, creates procedures that will help to properly investigate
complaints and promote a harassment-free work environment.
The policy needs to be distributed, posted, and discussed so that its
existence and importance will be apparent.
When a complaint is filed, it is important to take the report
seriously and consult legal counsel throughout the process. Many
sexual harassment lawsuits can be avoided if accusations are dealt
with professionally and promptly.146 Procedures set out in the insti-
tution's policy should be carefully followed. Acting quickly and in
a confidential manner are critical to ensure that both the com-
plainant and the accused are treated fairly. Remember that a
charge of harassment shall not, in and of itself, create the pre-
sumption of wrongdoing. Be certain to document the individual
interviews with the complaining employee, the accused, and ap-
propriate witnesses.
If the employer concludes that harassment has occurred, the
employer should take immediate action to solve the problem.
Disciplinary action may include reprimands, demotion, suspension,
or termination. Moreover, it is important to console the victim
and learn how the institution can become a safer environment.
Lastly, it is critical to educate the staff about sexual harass-
ment by holding meetings, seminars, and discussions with videos
and oral presentations. This also demonstrates that management
takes the issue seriously.
F. Recommending Former Employees 47
Before recommending a previous employee to a third party,
consider whether permission to make the recommendation was
given. If not, the employer may be liable to previous employees
for comments made about their work.'4s Also, permission from an
employee only offers limited protection.149 An employer must still
146. Arthur Gross Schaefer & Muriel A. Finegold, Creating A Harassment-Free
Workplace, RISK MGMT., Feb. 1995, at 53, 55.
147. Adapted from Ralph Quinones & Arthur Gross Schaefer, The Legal, Ethical
and Managerial Implications of the Neutral Employment Reference Policy,
(forthcoming Winter 1996) EMPLOYEE RuSP. & RTS. J.
148. Id. at 4; Paul W. Barada, Check References With Care, NATION'S Bus., May
1993, at 54.
149. Barada, supra note 147, at 54,56.
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be very careful about what is said.
When interviewing prospective employees it is unreasonable
to expect them to provide perfect information about their qualifi-
cations and experience. Therefore, employers attempt to obtain
information from former employers. Past performance is often the
best indicator of future job performance. Obviously, the sources
of a prospective employee's work history and other relevant in-
formation are former employers. However, due to the potential
for suit, the information available from former employers may be
limited."5
In recent years, the neutral employer or "no comment" refer-
ence policy has been adopted by numerous employers.5 1 Under
this policy, only neutral employment information is provided when
responding to a reference request. 52 The information includes
dates of employment, positions held, job responsibilities, and the
supervisor's name at time of termination." The neutral employee
policy has gained recent popularity in response to the growing
number of reference defamation suits filed against former employ-
ers.'l However, maintaining the neutral policy may have adverse
effects on a company and may be a disservice to the business
community.
If former employers share information with a prospective
employer, they run the risk of being sued by the dismissed em-
ployee for reference defamation. 5" Also, the prospective em-
ployer may be liable to a third party for negligent hiring.'56
Obviously, this presents the former employer with a litigation
dilemma. In fact, this entire topic can be confusing and frustrating.
First, ascertain that the party requesting the information has a
"legitimate business reason"' for requesting the information. The
150. Even when a company has not been found negligent, the cost in terms of le-
gal fees and time have been tremendous. Lewin, Boss Can Be Sued for Saying Too
Much, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at B26.
151. See Barada, supra note 147, at 54.
152. Id.
153. Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
45,46 (1995).
154. See id.; Stuart R. Deuring & John E. Murray, Three Steps to Take to Avoid
Employee Defamation Suits, CORP. LEGALTIMES, Apr. 1996, at 27.
155. See Barada, supra note 147, at 54.
156. See id; Michael Cox, Negligent Hiring and Retention: Availability of Action
Limited by Foreseeability Requirements, 10 N.M. L. REv. 491,493 (1980).
157. See Barada, supra note 147, at 54.
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former employer should limit the offerings to factual and verifiable
information. 5 The information provided should be limited by the
scope of the inquiry and should not give any additional and unre-
lated information.' s'
A professional approach to protect all interests is to establish
an institutional policy that allows each party to agree upon poten-
tially shared information.' 6' This eliminates the surprise factor and
protects the previous employer from reference defamation litiga-
tion.
61
At the beginning of the employment relationship, consider
providing employees with a reference consent form that will allow
the employer to release reference information during or after the
employment relationship.
Indicate to the employee that the policy is to not provide full
disclosure unless the employee agrees to such terms prior to a vol-
untary or involuntary termination. Emphasize that the employee
is not required to agree to the terms of the policy. This eliminates
any argument that the consent was obtained through coercion, ad-
hesion, oppression, or any other improper way.
At the conclusion of the employment relationship, have the
employee review the policy and consent to sharing reference in-
formation with prospective employers. This gives employees a
chance to rescind approval of the policy if they are unhappy with
their work experience or the termination was unpleasant. Be sure
that the policy regarding references is carefully and consistently
followed.
IV. INDIVIDUAL CLERGY TORT LIABILITY
"Tort" is a legal term synonymous with the concept of injury
to a person or property that society has determined should be
compensated." There are both intentional and unintentional
torts.'3 An intentional tort could be battery, assault, infliction of
mental distress, defamation, an invasion of privacy, or trespass-
ing' 64 Unintentional torts are often defined as negligence and
158. See id.; Buchanan Ingersoll, Unchecked Rumors Result in $10 Million Defa-
mation Award to Ex-schoolteacher, 6 PA. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER 5 (1996).
159. Barada, supra note 147, at 56; Deuring & Murray, supra note 153, at 27.
160. Barada, supra note 147, at 54.
161. Id.
162. LAWRENCE S. CLARK ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESs 77 (4th ed. 1994).
163. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 85, § 8, at 33.
164. CLARK ET AL., supra note 161, at 79-80; KEETON ET AL., supra note 85, §§ 9-
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strict liability.6' Negligence is an unintentional breach of duty that
results in harm to another.'6 Strict liability means that a person
who participates in certain kinds of activities is held responsible
for any resulting harm to others, despite the use of utmost care and
caution. 67 The importance here is that with recent changes in the
law, clergy have become increasingly personally susceptible for
such claims." 8
In past decades charitable immunity coupled with clergy
privilege often protected clergy and religious institutions from tort
liabilities.169 Clergy were made to feel that they would be immune
from civil liability as long as theyn carefully followed the rules
within their own religious tradition.' If that ever was the case, it
certainly is not today. Clergy are finding themselves increasingly
liable under a number of tort theories.
171
Clergy can be held personally responsible for their defamatory
comments that injure a person's reputation.7 True comments are
not slanderous and truth is an absolute defense to a defamation
suit, unless the comments are also invasions of privacy.'73 This
arises when a clergyperson publicly reveals a confidential disclo-
sure made by a member.7 4 Since clergy have a fiduciary respon-
sibility to the source of their privileged information, invading the
privacy of the speaker may make the church and pastor liable.'75
13, 111, 117, at 39-84,771-85, 849-68.
165. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 135, 669 (8th
ed. 1988).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note
85, § 30, at 164-65.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note
85, § 75, at 534-36.
168. See Ivy B. Dodes, "Suffer the Little Children ... " Toward a Judicial Recog-
nition of a Duty of Reasonable Care Owed Children by Religious Faith Healers, 16
HOVSTRA L. REv. 165, 166 n.8, 173 (1987).
169. KEETON ET AL., supra note 85, § 133, at 1069-70; see O'Reilly & Strasser, su-
pra note 6, at 59-63.
170. Gross Schaefer, supra note 17, at 218.
171. Kelly Beers Rouse, Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Problem for Religious
Organizations, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 383,385-86 (1989).
172. Clergy enjoy no special protection from defamation suits. Marshall v.
Munro, 845 P.2d 424,428 (Alaska 1993).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 85, § 117, at 856.
174. See Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal. App. 3d 297, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1989).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979). "A fiduciary relation
exists between two persons. when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give
advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation." Id.
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Generally, if the person talking with the clergyperson expects con-
fidentiality, then the pastor has a fiduciary responsibility to protect
the details of the conversation. 176  Making public any comment
made in the confessional or other confidential situation may vio-
late the rights and expectations of the congregant and expose the
clergyperson to potential liability.'77
There is a growing awareness of the problem of clergy sexual
boundary violations.1 78 For example, "in the past decade the Epis-
copal Church has seen the incidence of clergy sexual misconduct
almost double.' 7  With regards to clergy sexual misconduct,
clergy may be held liable for having sexual relations with con-
gregants." The legal theories include interference with a marital
relationship if the congregant is married 8' and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm.1 A clergyperson may be liable for inflict-
ing emotional distress if it can be proven that the clergyperson in-
tentionally or recklessly caused severe distress and anguish.8 ' In
one highly publicized case, three women won a $3 million verdict
against a priest but lost their suit to collect against the diocese's in-
surance company.184
The particular clergyperson may also be liable for the negli-
at cmt. a.
176. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (stating that a fiduciary
duty may arise from the confidential relationship between clergy and a person con-
fiding in clergy in a counseling setting).
177. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 85, § 117, at 856-59 & Supp. 121 n.6.5.
178. According to a survey in a Christian magazine, "one in 10 pastors (12 per-
cent) admitted to having full sexual affairs outside their marriages. One in five (18
percent) admitted to some form of sexual contact with someone other than their
spouse." Kim Luman, Adults Suffering Bulk of Sexual Abuse, CALGARY HERALD,
Sept. 24, 1994, at A8.
179. Celia Sibley, Churches Forging Policies on Clergy Sexual Misconduct,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 13,1993, at J4.
180. A jury recently awarded $135,000 in damages to a plaintiff-herself an or-
dained Methodist minister-when her pastor "turned pastoral counseling sessions
stemming from the death of her mother into an improper sexual relationship that
lasted from 1987-1991." Lee Moriwaki, Jury Awards $135,000 in Clergy Sexual-
Abuse Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at B3.
181. Courts have recognized an actionable claim for interference with a marital
relationship. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 124, 873 (4th
ed. 1971).
182. CLARK ET AL., supra note 161, at 80.
183. Jane Doe v. Dermody, No. 514187 (Sacramento Super. Ct. Feb. 1992).
"Priests' sexual misconduct cost the Archdiocese of Chicago $4.3 million in the fiscal
year ending June 1994-up 54% from $2.8 million in 1993." Kevin Kelly, Black Cas-
socks and Red Ink, Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 1995, at 6.
184. Ramon Coronado, Priest-Abused Victims Lose Bid for Money, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Apr. 21, 1995, at B3.
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gent hiring, supervising, and training of those who commit sexual
transgressions."' In addition, religious institutions may well find
themselves defendants under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior."' Employers may be responsible for the torts of their em-
ployees if the tort was committed within the time, space, and scope
of employment and the act is the kind of which the employee is
hired to perform.'7 If any of the following questions can be an-
swered in the affirmative, the institution may be responsible for
their employee's actions.
A. Was the Tort Committed Within the Time and Space Limits of the
Employment?
If the act was done during off-hours, it may not be considered
within the scope of employment."
B. Was the Employee Attempting to Serve the Employer with Such an
Act?
If the act was self-serving and in no way facilitated the em-
ployer's business objective, the employer may not be liable.189
C. Was the Act of a Similar Nature as Other Authorized Conduct?
It is generally accepted that employees' actions during their
free time will not result in liability for the hiring institution.9 '
However, when is a clergyperson at work? This can be a very
problematic issue. Arguably, a clergyperson is constantly at
work. 9' The twenty-four hour nature of the clergy profession cer-
tainly may provide ample opportunity to claim that a particular
action was within the scope of the clergy's employment, thus
making the religious institution liable for any of the clergy's ac-
tions. It is therefore incumbent on the religious institution and the
lay leadership to quickly respond and effectively deal with clergy
behavior that may result in legal liability to the institution.
185. CLARK ET AL., supra note 161, at 317; see, e.g., Destefano, 763 P.2d at 275.
186. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 742.




191. This is a debatable issue. Priests, who take the vow of obedience, are under
the strict control of their Ordinary. Arguably, a priest is a priest twenty-four hours a
day because the priest's job requires his attention twenty-four hours a day, and the
priest's vows do not allow him to take any "time off" from being a religious leader.
[Vol. 30:177
NO SANCTUARY FROM THE LAW
V. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: DUTIES, LIABILITIES, INSURANCE'
12
The nature of the nonprofit charitable organization is unique
when compared to all other forms of business ventures. The ac-
tivities of the nonprofit institution are dedicated to the pursuit of
the corporation's charitable purposes and not to enrich the share-
holders' purses.'93 Although all officers and directors have fiduci-
ary duties to their business organizations, the directors and officers
of nonprofit organizations are expected to adhere to a very high
standard of conduct due to public trust and certain benefits such as
the tax-exempt status, reduced postage rates, and the right to so-
licit funds. 94 Directors are expected to put the organization before
any of their own personal benefits.'9 5 As can be expected due to
the nature of their jobs, clergy often act as directors or officers for
a variety of community organizations including their own religious
institutions.
A. Responsibilities of Directors and Officers
Clergy may act as directors or officers to their religious insti-
tution or to other nonprofit organizations. The most important
aspect of directors' and officers' responsibilities is to guide the or-
ganization in ways to ensure that it continually pursues its chari-
table purpose.'96 Directors and officers of nonprofit corporations
have fiduciary duties to the corporation and must act within their
authority and within the powers of the corporation; they must also
make their decisions with care, loyalty, and good faith.'9 Argua-
bly, such decisions must also be made to serve third-party mem-
bers to ensure that the organization's actions do not harm them.
192. The author recognizes that there are different views on the issue of whether
directors of nonprofit corporations owe the same duty to their corporation as direc-
tors of for-profit corporations owe to their corporations. See DANIEL L. KuRTZ,
BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 30 (1988). However, the
author feels that the better, more cautious approach is for nonprofit directors to ad-
here to the same standards as directors of for-profit corporations. See id. Therefore,
some of the sources cited herein relate specifically to nonprofit corporations while
others relate to for-profit corporations.
193. Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Non Profit Corporations,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 132 (1993).
194. See Developments in the Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1593 (1992).
195. See id. at 1590-92; METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 867.
196. See Thomas H. Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State
Not-for-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REv. 725, 727-29 (1987).
197. METZGER ET AL, supra note 86, at 867.
November 1996]
208 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
1. Duty of care
Directors and officers are required to assume their duties
"with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under like circumstances."'98 They have a respon-
sibility to act with common sense, practical wisdom, and informed
judgment. Since directors and officers typically rely on informa-
tion supplied by employees, staff, and professional consultants-
attorneys, lawyers, and other clergy-they should make a reason-
able investigation prior to making a corporate decision. There-
fore, prudent directors and officers should inform themselves of
the risks and potential harm associated with their decisions and
continually seek to make reasonable, informed decisions that are
in the best interest of the corporation. This duty of care is often
expressed as the business judgment rule,'99 discussed below.
2. Duty of loyalty and good faith
Remaining loyal to the corporation means acting solely in the
best interests of the organization.2 0 Directors and officers breach
their duty of loyalty if they attempt to profit personally at the ex-
pense of the nonprofit organization.' Serious penalties face lead-
ers who mix their personal interests with the interests of the corpo-
ration . 2 Directors and managers owe the duty of utmost loyalty
and fidelity and are generally not allowed to self-deal, make secret
profits, be in a position of a conflict of interest, or usurp corporate
opportunities.0 Such violations may occur when a director or of-
ficer in an official status becomes aware of a business opportunity
that would benefit the corporation. 4 Under a fiduciary duty to
the organization, the director or officer may not take personal ad-
vantage of any situation unless there is full disclosure and the
noninvolved directors approve the intended action." s With only
198. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30(a)(2) (1993).
199. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 868.
200. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see Marcia M. McMurray,
Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the
Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 623 (1987).
201. See Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410,
414, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (1983).
202. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5233(h), 9243(h) (West 1990).
203. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 876-77.
204. Id.; see Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 519, 533,
256 P.2d 677, 686 (1953).
205. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 876-77.
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one minor exception, directors and officers must refrain from par-
ticipating in transactions in which they have a financial interest.
However, if it can be proven that a corporate move is in the best
interest of the institution and would also benefit a director, it may
be allowed if there has been full disclosure.i Prior to this mutu-
ally beneficial transaction, the benefit to the corporation must be
confirmed through full disclosure of the director's and officer's
private interests versus that of the organization's. 28 In addition, all
disinterested board members must approve the transaction, indi-
cating that the corporation could not have found a better deal with
reasonable effort.2 9
Often within the religious community, clergy serve on boards
of several nonprofit corporations. In the business world, serving
on boards of competing companies can cause several legal prob-
lems.2 0 However, in the nonprofit world, there is less concern of
running afoul of both one's legal and ethical duties. There are le-
gal issues that arise if there are dealings between two nonprofit in-
stitutions that share the same board member.2' Accordingly, the
director should announce the possible conflict of interest and con-
sider not participating in the deliberations or the vote.
The lesson here is that it is wise to avoid engagements that
might even suggest a conflict of interest between a director's or
officer's personal interests and the interests of the corporation.
Also, if there is any doubt as to whether an action may cause a
breach of duty, then the director or officer should fully disclose the
possible conflict.
B. Directors' and Officers' Liability
Directors and officers are bound to act within the authority
given to them by their corporation's bylaws.2 2 As long as they act
within the scope of the company's business and their own author-
ity, they may be protected from individual liability claims.2 3 How-
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id- at 876.
209. Id. at 868; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233(d)(2) (West 1990).
210. For example, the Clayton Act of 1914 prohibits interlocking directorates. 15
U.S.C. § 19 (1994).
211. See KuRTz, supra note 191, at 59 (noting that the duty of loyalty may be vio-
lated by pursuing the interests of another nonprofit organization).
212. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 867.
213. Id. at 868.
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ever, if they fail to uphold a duty of care by acting negligently or
fraudulently or if they attempt to usurp a corporate opportunity
they may be personally liable. I'
Directors and officers who make intentionally fraudulent
statements about the corporation may be liable to the organization
or to those who are harmed by such reports.215 Directors and offi-
cers whose negligent actions inflict harm on another person may
be personally liable to that person.2" Although nonprofit organi-
zations may not be subject to income or other types of taxes, they
217are always liable for various payroll taxes. Failure to pay state
and federal withholding taxes or workers' compensation contribu-
tions may also put liability onto the directors and officers.218 In
addition, directors and officers may be held liable for the torts of
their corporation's employees if they authorize or participate in
committing the tort.2 9
When a third party is injured on a corporation's property or at
an event sponsored by the corporation, its directors and officers
may be liable for the injuries suffered if the directors authorized
the corporation's action that resulted in injury; the directors or of-
ficers were aware or should have been privy to the potential for
danger but failed to take action to remove the danger; and a pru-
dent person in the directors' or officers' position would have taken
a different course of action.2 2
The business judgment rule protects directors and officers
from personal liability for honest errors in judgment.2' The pur-
pose of this rule acknowledges human error and relieves directors
of the fear of being second-guessed by the court system.m Here, if
directors and officers act with care and good faith and can prove
they made an informed decision on a rational basis and without
214. McMurray, supra note 199, at 626-28.
215. Under the Securities Act of 1933, an officer or director may be liable if acting
with scienter-the knowledge of untruth or the reckless disregard for the truth. 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
216. CLARK ETAL., supra note 161, at 312-19.
217. See KURTZ, supra note 191, at 98-99; MARILYN E. PHELAN, REPRESENTING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1-10.70 (1996).
218. John D. Jackson & Alan W. Tompkins, Corporations and Limited Liability
Companies, 47 SMU L. REV. 901, 912 (1994).
219. See the discussion of respondeat superior, supra note 87.
220. Willburt D. Ham, Kentucky Law Survey, 74 Ky. L.J. 281,307 n.157 (1985).
221. METZGER ET AL., supra note 86, at 868; see Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d
625, 642 (1944).
222. METZGER ETAL., supra note 86, at 868.
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conflict of interest, they will generally be legally protected.22
However, if it is found that the director or officer acted negli-
gently, did not make an informed decision, or acted in bad faith,
then that officer or director can be held personally liable. 4
With regard to third-party liability, a few statutes exist that
protect volunteer directors of nonprofit organizations. If the non-
profit organization maintains a fixed amount of insurance cover-
age, then "no cause of action for monetary damages shall arise
against any person serving without compensation as a director," if
the director's conduct meets the duty of care standard.22 The
same protection is afforded to volunteer directors even without in-
surance, as long as the board has made "all reasonable efforts" to
obtain such insurance.
C. Directors' and Officers' Insurance
1. Indemnification
The cost of defending a lawsuit or criminal charge brought
against a director can be enormous.27 To induce or persuade
people to become directors, corporations often indemnify them for
such costs.m The key issue when dealing with directors' insurance
is whether or not the nonprofit institution can and will advance
funds to the director or officer to pay for a legal defense. In some
situations the organization will front the necessary money for pre-
trial expenses, and in others, directors or officers will need to
spend their own money on legal fees and hope that the corporation
will reimburse or indemnify them.22' The nonprofit organization's
223. Id.
224. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5231, 9242 (West 1990).
225. Id. § 5047.5(b).
226. Id §§ 5239(a)(4), 9247(a)(4).
227. Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and
Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 805-06 (1987); see Robert H. Rosh, Note,
New York's Response to the Director and Officer Liability Crisis: A Need to Re-
examine the Importance of D & 0 Liability Insurance, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1305, 1308
(1989).
228. See Kimberly C. Harris, Recent Development. The Impact of Bankruptcy on
Liability of Corporate Directors, 5 BANK. DEv. J. 289 (1987); Ross, supra note 226, at
787.
229. See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Offi-
cers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Is-
sues, 51 Bus. LAW. 573 (1996) (discussing various consequences of indemnification
and liability insurance).
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bylaws or minutes may specify to what extent indemnification ex-
ists. 30 Alternatively, the board of directors can vote to reimburse
or indemnify a particular director or officer for a particular situa-
tion."'
There are three possible outcomes of litigation: victory, loss,
or settlement. Generally, a director who successfully defends
against a suit will be reimbursed by the nonprofit organization.
When there is a third party settlement, the reimbursement picture
is a little less clear. The nonprofit organization may indemnify the
director or officer against all losses including legal expenses, judg-
ments, fines, penalties, and settlement payments if a majority of
the board decides that the director acted in good faith, in the best
interests of the company, and without criminal intent.2 "3 However,
if a director or officer is found liable for breach of duty, the non-
profit organization may indemnify the director for defense ex-
penses only, not for the cost of judgment, unless the court decides
the director is entitled to such reimbursement.3
Nonprofit institutions are legally required to indemnify a di-
rector who has successfully defended a lawsuit.2 35 However, the
clergyperson involved must first put up personal funds to fight the
prospective lawsuit. It would be wise for religious professionals to
become knowledgeable of what coverage, if any, the religious insti-
tution carries and what is covered in case of a lawsuit.
2. Coverage
In light of the potential liability, it is wise to consider acquir-
ing directors' and officers' insurance when possible. When an or-
ganization purchases directors' and officers' liability insurance, it is
actually buying an indemnification policy which will reimburse the
organization for the costs of indemnifying a director or will reim-
burse the director for costs incurred when the nonprofit organiza-
230. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5238, 9246 (West 1996).
231. Id.
232- Id.
233. Peter B. Manzo, Obligations and Possible Liabilities of Directors of Non-
profit Public Benefit Religious Corporations (Nov. 18, 1993) (on file with the Loyola
of LosAngeles Law Review) (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5238, 9246 (West 1996)).
234. CAL. CORP. CODE 33 5238(c), 9246(c) (West 1996).
235. Manzo, supra note 232, at 12; see also CAL. CORP. CODE 33 5238(d), 9246(d)
(West 1996) (allowing a corporation to indemnify a director unless the director was
adjudged liable to the corporation in performance of the director's duties).
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tion cannot pay.236
Directors' and officers' coverage typically pays for defense
costs and loss at the time of judgment or settlement. It is possible
that the defense costs could consume all of the coverage and leave
the director or corporation with a large balance owed if the case is
lost. Further, since insurance companies generally do not have a
duty to defend in breach of duty of loyalty cases,23 the director or
officer is often forced to use personal funds until the action is de-
cided by a court or is settled. This places some pressure on the di-
rector to settle cases before trial.
Not all directors' and officers' insurance policies are the same.
Many policies exclude coverage for bodily injury, property dam-
age, libel, and slander since these issues are typically covered un-
der general liability policies.238 While shopping for a directors' and
officers' policy, one should be certain that a lawyer explains what
the policy does and does not cover. Consider the following ques-
tions: Will the policy automatically cover directors who begin
service after the policy has taken effect? Will the insurer advance
funds to pay defense costs as they become due? What coverage
will it give for claims arising from events occurring before the pol-
icy's period? Does the insurer have a right to approve the in-
sured's legal counsel? Does the policy impose a fixed duty on the
director? Does the insurer have a duty to defend? What are the
policy's limits and deductibles?
VI. CREATING EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLERGY AND
LEGAL ADVISERS
Conscious of all the information covered in this Article, a
priest, pastor, or rabbi may feel overwhelmed. Certainly there are
many real issues as well as reasonable solutions facing clergy.
Therefore, it is critical that clergy seek out level-headed and com-
petent legal advisers. Undoubtedly, this may cost some time and
money. Often a well-intentioned member of the congregation who
is an attorney will offer legal services free of charge.
Remember the best legal advice is always preventive. It
236. Manzo, supra note 232, at 14.
237. Director and officer policies typically exclude self-dealing and other breaches
of the duty of loyalty. KURTZ, supra note 191, at 113.
238. Id.; Fred J. Lower, Jr., Potential Legal Liabilities of Members of Non-profit
Boards of Directors, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California, at 6
(Nov. 18, 1993) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
November 1996]
214 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
would be wise for a pastor or rabbi to spend time with a legal advi-
sor reviewing this Article and developing good preventive strate-
gies. The best time to call a lawyer is before there is a problem.
Moreover, no attorney is an expert in all legal areas and there-
fore clergy cannot rely on a single legal advisor to deal with all the
issues that arise. Since bad advice can be costly, unless the attor-
ney is very familiar with the particular legal problem under deci-
sion, the advice may be worth even less than what is being paid.
One final note is that while clergy often deal with religious doc-
trines that seem timeless, legal rules change almost daily. Accord-
ingly, the clergyperson and the legal advisor should meet annually
to discuss pertinent changes in the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cicero wrote, "No power should be above the law."29 While
he may not have been talking about clergy or religious institutions,
this sentiment is more true today regarding our religious leaders
than it was in the past. All things considered, clergy must establish
good relations with a legal counsel and become more aware of the
legal environment. Once pastors, priests, and rabbis are better in-
formed, they will be better able to protect themselves and their in-
stitutions from potential legal controversies. As many clergy have
learned, an ounce of preventive law is often worth a whole bushel
of defense lawyers. 240
239. See BURTON STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 1088(1967).
240. Loosely based on the old English proverb, "An ounce of discretion is worth a
pound of wit." Id. at 456.
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